



Procedural Misjoinder: The Quest for a Uniform 
Standard* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Litigants know the importance of the litigation forum.
1
  Recognizing 
favorable judges and evidentiary rules,
2
 plaintiffs generally want to 
litigate in state court while defendants prefer federal court.
3
  The 
potential for an unfavorable forum, as well as the unfavorable rulings 





 a doctrine that allows the federal court to take 
jurisdiction when joinder rules have been used improperly, has become 
an important tool in the battle for a favorable forum.
6
  However, the lack 
of a consistent framework for the doctrine has left courts and litigants 
with a great deal of uncertainty.
7
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 1.  See Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1677 (1990). 
 2.  E. Farish Percy, Making a Federal Case of it: Removing Civil Cases to Federal Court 
Based on Fraudulent Joinder, 91 IOWA L. REV. 189, 206 & n.110 (2005) (describing a “variety of 
factors that may influence plaintiffs’ general preference to litigate in state court,” including local 
attorneys’ comfort with home-state court systems, the increased chances of summary judgment in 
federal courts, the cost of federal pretrial activities, and the relative liberality of state rules governing 
permissive joinder). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  See E. Farish Percy, Defining the Contours of the Emerging Fraudulent Misjoinder 
Doctrine, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569, 570–71 (2006) (“[P]laintiffs, who generally prefer to 
litigate in state court, and defendants, who generally prefer to litigate in federal court, continue to 
fight forum selection battles with increasing intensity . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 5.  Procedural misjoinder is sometimes referred to as fraudulent misjoinder, but is actually a 
distinct concept.  Fraudulent joinder occurs when the parties have no factual or legal basis for 
joining the claims.  Laura J. Hines & Steven S. Gensler, Driving Misjoinder: The Improper Party 
Problem in Removal Jurisdiction, 57 ALA. L. REV. 779, 781 (2006).  Procedural misjoinder, on the 
other hand, occurs when the party has no procedural basis for joining the claims.  Percy, supra note 
4, at 782. 
 6.  See Hines & Gensler, supra note 5, at 783 (describing procedural misjoinder as a vital 
judicial tool to police joinder gamesmanship). 
 7.  See, e.g., Rutherford v. Merck & Co. Inc., 428 F. Supp. 2d 842, 852–53 (S.D. Ill. 2006); 
Reuter v. Medronics, Inc., No. 10–3019 (WJM), 2010 WL 4628439, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2010); 
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The plaintiff, as the “master of the complaint” initially chooses the 
forum of the litigation.
8
  The defendant, however, has a statutory right to 
remove a case involving state law to federal court based on diversity of 
citizenship.
9
  Removal based on diversity jurisdiction is proper when the 
amount in controversy is more than $75,000 and there is complete 
diversity among the parties.
10
  Parties are completely diverse if no 
plaintiffs and no defendants are citizens of the same state.
11
 
Procedural misjoinder addresses the complete diversity 
requirement.
12
  Anticipating removal by defendants, plaintiffs join at 
least one plaintiff from each state in which the defendants are citizens.
13
  
This anticipatory action has been termed a “jurisdictional spoiler.”
14
  
After defendants remove the case to federal court, the plaintiffs move to 
remand to state court by citing of the lack of complete diversity.
15
  In 
response, the defendants urge the court to apply the procedural 
misjoinder doctrine and ignore the citizenship of the parties improperly 
joined to destroy diversity.
16
  Procedural misjoinder allows the court to 
disregard the citizenship of the “jurisdictional spoilers” and exercise 
removal jurisdiction.
17
  Under the procedural misjoinder doctrine, the 
                                                          
Palmer v. Davol, Inc., No. 07–md–1842–ML, No. 08–cv–02499–ML, 2008 WL 5377991, at *3 
(D.R.I. Dec. 23, 2008); Asher v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., No. Civ. A. 04CV522KKC, 2005 
WL 1593941, at *5 (E.D. Ky. June 30, 2005). 
 8.  Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 
 9.  28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2012). 
 10.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012). 
 11.  28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
 12.  Hines & Gensler, supra note 5, at 780. 
 13.  See Hines & Gensler, supra note 5, at 781 (“It is no secret that plaintiffs often deliberately 
structure their state court lawsuits to prevent removal by defendants to federal court.”); 1 MICHAEL 
L. WILLIAMS & BRIAN S. CAMPF, LITIGATING TORT CASES § 5:33 (“In recent tabacco litigation, 
there has been an effort to add retailers and local employees of cigarette manufacturers to keep cases 
in state court.”). 
 14.  Hines & Gensler, supra note 5, at 781; Percy, supra note 4, at 571. 
 15.  See, e.g., In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 136, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(acknowledging that several courts have applied procedural misjoinder in the context of remand 
petitions). 
 16.  See, e.g., In re Propecia (Finasteride) Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 12–MD–2331(JG)(VVP), 
2013 WL 3729570, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 17, 2013) (“[The defendants] also argue that the misjoinder 
of the plaintiffs is egregious and therefore the claims should be severed and the motion to remand 
denied.”).  
 17.  See Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated on 
other grounds by Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1072 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
the diversity of citizenship was satisfied by reason of fraudulent joinder).  Though the Tapscott court 
referred to the procedural misjoinder as a species of fraudulent joinder, courts and commentators 
agree that procedural misjoinder is a distinct doctrine.  See, e.g., Hines & Gensler, supra note 5, at 
781; Percy, supra note 4, at 782; Reeves v. Pfizer, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 926, 927 (S.D. Ill. 2012). 
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court can take jurisdiction over the diverse parties and remand only the 
non-diverse parties to state court.
18
  Recognizing the need to preserve the 
defendants’ statutory right of removal, many federal courts have adopted 
the procedural misjoinder doctrine.
19
 
Multi-plaintiff pharmaceutical actions present an illustrative and 
common example of the policy concerns addressed by the doctrine.
20
  In 
an action against a large pharmaceutical company potential plaintiffs 
span the continent and possibly the globe.  Thus, in a pharmaceutical 
action a plaintiff can likely find another person who is a citizen of the 
same state and who has a potential claim against the company.  The 
plaintiff, then, need only join that person to the lawsuit to defeat 
complete diversity even if the joinder of that person constitutes 
misjoinder under Rule 20.  Absent the procedural misjoinder doctrine, 
the plaintiff would successfully prevent the defendant from removing to 
federal court by manipulating the joinder rules.
21
 
On the other hand, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction 
and should not use judicial mechanisms to infringe on the jurisdiction of 
the state courts.
22
  Plaintiffs who have similar claims against the same or 
a similar pharmaceutical company may have good reason to join the suits 
together in state court.  Indeed, questions of law or fact may be common 
and expensive to litigate.
23
  An unclear standard could result in federal 
                                                          
 18.  See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. Civ. A. 98–20478, 1203, 1999 WL 
554584, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 1999) (“Because the court finds that the Plaintiffs that destroy 
diversity jurisdiction are fraudulently joined it may ignore the citizenship of the [sic] those parties 
and exercise jurisdiction over this civil action.”). 
 19.  See, e.g., Rezulin, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 147 (explaining that while cost and efficiency benefits 
of joining plaintiffs are not immaterial, “they simply do not carry the same weight when balanced 
against the defendant’s right to removal”); In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, 
Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 667, 673 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (explaining that a 
non-diverse plaintiff cannot defeat a defendant’s right to removal “if there is no reasonable basis for 
the joinder of that non-diverse plaintiff” because “[s]uch ‘procedural misjoinder’ would be a 
plaintiff’s purposeful attempt to defeat removal” (citation omitted)). 
 20.  Propecia, 2013 WL 3729570, at *6–8. 
 21.  13F CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3641.1 (3d 
ed.) (“It probably is the case that the most common device used to destroy diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction and the possibility of removal is for a state court plaintiff to join a party whose presence 
in the case creates the prohibited cocitizenship on both sides of the litigation, thereby preventing 
satisfaction of the complete diversity rule.”) 
 22.  See Moore v. Mobil Oil Corp., 904 F. Supp. 587, 588 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (“This court cannot 
rewrite the removal statute to grant itself subject matter jurisdiction.”); Rutherford v. Merck & Co. 
Inc., 428 F. Supp. 2d 842, 852 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (“In the Court’s view, [procedural misjoinder] is an 
improper expansion of the scope of federal diversity jurisdiction by the federal courts.” (citing In re 
Norplant Contraceptive Prod. Liab. Litig., 976 F. Supp. 559, 561 (E.D. Tex. 1997))). 
 23.  See Rezulin, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 147 (acknowledging the costs and efficiency benefits of 
joining plaintiffs). 
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courts inappropriately expanding their diversity jurisdiction without the 
authorization of Congress.
24
  Therefore, a clear and uniform standard is 
essential to clearly define the boundaries of the doctrine.
25
 
Although courts have often applied the procedural misjoinder to this 
common scenario, the development of the doctrine has been erratic and 
confusing.  The questions surrounding the doctrine have been primarily 
focused on two questions: 1) whether to adopt procedural misjoinder;
26
 
and 2) what type of misjoinder warrants application of the doctrine.
27
  
This comment, while briefly describing the benefits of adopting 
procedural misjoinder, explores the second question: what type of 
misjoinder warrants application of the doctrine.
28
 
Part II of this comment describes the development of the procedural 
misjoinder doctrine from its adoption in Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service 
Corporation
29
 and describes the difficulty that followed.  This section 
specifically focuses on two of the circuit courts that have addressed the 
issue: the Eleventh Circuit in Tapscott and the Eighth Circuit in In re 
Prempro Products Liability Litigation.
30
  Part III briefly discusses the 
benefits of adopting the doctrine and analyzes the shortcomings of 
Prempro, noting that the time for clarification is now. 
Finally, this comment argues that although the evolution and 
application of the procedural misjoinder doctrine has been inconsistent, a 
framework for application has begun to emerge.  Accordingly, courts 
applying the procedural misjoinder doctrine should adopt a multi-factor 
                                                          
 24.  Percy, supra note 4, at 621. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  See, e.g., Hines & Gensler, supra note 5 (arguing that the procedural misjoinder doctrine 
should be adopted); Ronald A. Parsons, Jr., Should the Eighth Circuit Recognize Procedural 
Misjoinder?, 53 S.D.  L. REV. 52 (2008) (urging the Eighth Circuit to reject the doctrine); see also 
Rutherford, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (refusing to adopt the doctrine); Fore Invs., LLC v. Travelers 
Indem. Co., No. 1:12–CV–01702–SEB–DML, 2013 WL 3467328, at *4–*5 (S.D. Ind. July 9, 2013) 
(noting that district courts are divided on the viability of the procedural misjoinder doctrine). 
 27.  See, e.g., Percy, supra note 4 (arguing that the corresponding fraudulent joinder standard is 
the appropriate standard to apply); Rezulin, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 147–48 (refusing to apply the 
egregiousness standard). 
 28.  In addition, there has been some question as to which procedural rules apply, state or 
federal.  See, e.g., Palermo v. Letourneau Techs. Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 499, 516 (S.D. Miss. 2008) 
(“The first determination to be made is whether, when considering the joinder of parties, a court 
should rely on Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or its state law counterpart . . . .”). 
Oftentimes, however, the state and federal rules are nearly identical, making the question more 
theoretical than practical.  Conk v. Richards & O’Neil, LLP, 77 F. Supp. 2d 956, 971 (S.D. Ind. 
1999).  
 29.  77 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Cohen v. Office 
Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1072 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 30.  591 F.3d 613 (8th Cir. 2010). 
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test for uniform application. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Procedural Misjoinder: An Introduction 
Procedural misjoinder, often referred to as fraudulent misjoinder,
31
 is 
a doctrine that protects a party from losing their right to remove a case to 
federal court because of misuse of the joinder rules.
32
  A party can 
remove a case to federal court if it could have been filed there in the first 
place,
33
 and under 28 U.S.C § 1332 the federal court has jurisdiction over 
cases when the parties are completely diverse and the amount in 
controversy is over $75,000.
34
  Procedural misjoinder addresses the first 
prong the federal court’s Section 1332 jurisdiction—complete diversity. 
Although the Constitution allows a federal court to take jurisdiction 
over cases where there is minimal diversity,
35
 Congress, through statute 
only allows federal courts to have jurisdiction when the parties are 
completely diverse.
36
  Minimal diversity requires only that one party be a 
citizen of a different state than at least one opposing party.
37
  Complete 
diversity, on the other hand, is present when no plaintiffs and no 
defendants are citizens of the same state.
38
  Accordingly, when one 
defendant is from the same state as one plaintiff, complete diversity does 
not exist and the federal court cannot have jurisdiction over the case. 
Procedural misjoinder addresses the situation where complete 
diversity exists technically, but perhaps not rightfully.  Rule 20 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows parties to be joined if they assert 
relief “arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 
transactions or occurrences” and any question of law or fact common to 
the plaintiffs will arise in the action.
39
  Typically, courts have applied 
Rule 20 liberally to promote judicial efficiency.
40
  However, misjoinder 
                                                          
 31.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 32.  See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 33.  28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2012). 
 34.  28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
 35.  State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967). 
 36.  28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
 37.  State Farm, 386 U.S. at 530. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  FED. R. CIV. P. 20. 
 40.  14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1653 (4th 
ed.); see also Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1334 (8th Cir. 1974). 
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Parties have often attempted to use misjoinder as a tool to defeat 
jurisdictional restrictions,
42
 and historically the doctrine of fraudulent 
joinder has addressed this problem.
43
  Fraudulent joinder happens when 
the parties have no factual or legal basis for joining the claims.
44
  
Fraudulent joinder doctrine allows the court to ignore the lack of 
diversity and take jurisdiction over the case. 
Procedural misjoinder was first described as a species of fraudulent 
joinder.
45
  However, courts and commentators agree that procedural 
misjoinder is a distinct and separate doctrine.
46
  Procedural misjoinder 
occurs when the party has no procedural basis for joining the claims.
47
  
In other words, a plaintiff that is joined may have a claim against one of 
the defendants, but it does not arise out of the same transaction or 
occurrence as the other plaintiffs.  Put simply, procedural misjoinder 
occurs when there is no reason to join the claims, and fraudulent joinder 
occurs when there is no claim.
48
  Procedural misjoinder, assuming the 
jurisdiction accepts the doctrine as viable, allows the federal court to take 
jurisdiction over the diverse claims.
49
 
                                                          
 41.  Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated on 
other grounds by Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1072 (11th Cir. 2000); WRIGHT, supra 
note 40, § 3723. 
 42.  See Hines & Gensler, supra note 5, at 781 (“It is no secret that plaintiffs often deliberately 
structure their state court lawsuits to prevent removal by defendants to federal court.”). 
 43.  See Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1360 (holding that the diversity of citizenship requirement was 
satisfied by reason of fraudulent joinder); see also Paul Rosenthal, Improper Joinder: Confronting 
Plaintiffs’ Attempts to Destroy Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 49, 60–65 
(2008) (discussing plaintiffs’ strategies to avoid removal and defendants’ common response: 
fraudulent joinder); WRIGHT, supra note 21, § 3641.1 (explaining that an improper joinder of a 
nondiverse party “typically is followed by a motion to remand by the plaintiff, which will be 
opposed by the removing defendant with the assertion that the state court joinder was ‘fraudulent.’”); 
Percy, supra note 2, at 206 (noting that the Supreme Court has long recognized the doctrine of 
fraudulent joinder). 
 44.  See, e.g., Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152 (1914) (holding that a 
defendant’s right to removal cannot be defeated by a joinder of a party with “no real connection to 
the controversy”). 
 45.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 46.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 47.  Hines & Gensler, supra note 5, at 780. 
 48.  Tomlinson v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. CV 13–00554 SOM–BMK, 2014 WL 
346922, at *7 (D. Haw. 2014). 
 49.  See, e.g., In re Diet Drugs, No. Civ. A. 98–20478, 1203, 1999 WL 554584, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 
July 16, 1999) (“Because the court finds that the Plaintiffs that destroy diversity jurisdiction are 
fraudulently joined it may ignore the citizenship of the [sic] those parties and exercise jurisdiction 
over this civil action.”). 
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Procedural misjoinder is often applied in cases with similar 
procedural posture.
50
  The plaintiff is the “master of the complaint” and 
initially chooses the forum for the litigation.
51
  Recognizing the 
importance of the litigation forum, plaintiffs generally prefer to litigate in 
state court because, in general, they see state court judges and 
evidentiary rules as favorable to their position.
52
  So, many of the cases 
that ultimately apply procedural misjoinder begin in state courts. 
Defendants often prefer the federal courts to state courts,
53
  and 28 
U.S.C. § 1441 gives a defendant the right to remove a case to federal 
court if it could have been brought in federal court in the first place.
54
  
Anticipating that the defendant will remove the case to federal court if 
the parties are diverse, plaintiffs join parties to suit that are non-diverse.  
In other words, the plaintiffs join at least one additional plaintiff that is a 
citizen of the same state as at least one defendant.  Thus, at least 
technically, complete diversity does not exist and defendants cannot 
remove the case to federal court.  Enter procedural misjoinder. 
Defendants remove the case to federal court asserting that the 
plaintiffs have been misjoined, and that, applying the procedural 
misjoinder doctrine, the federal court has jurisdiction over the diverse 
claims.  Plaintiffs argue that complete diversity is lacking and the case 
should be remanded to state court.  Hence, procedural misjoinder is often 
applied when the court addresses the plaintiffs’ motion to remand to state 
court. 
B. Development of Procedural Misjoinder 
1. A New Doctrine: Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp.
55
 
The Eleventh Circuit first adopted the procedural misjoinder doctrine 
                                                          
 50.  See In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 136, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(acknowledging that several courts have applied procedural misjoinder in the context of remand 
petitions); WRIGHT, supra note 21, § 3641.1 (“If the defendant believes the state court joinder of a 
nondiverse party to be improper, he or she will remove the action.  That typically is followed by a 
motion to remand by the plaintiff, which will be opposed by the removing defendant with the 
assertion that the state court joinder was ‘fraudulent.’”). 
 51.  Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 
 52.  See supra note 4. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2012). 
 55.  77 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Cohen v. Office 
Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 1072 (11th Cir. 2000). 
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in Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service Corporation.
56
  In that case, the 
plaintiffs tried to merge two distinct lawsuits.
57
  In the initial and first 
amended complaint, a group of plaintiffs sued a group of defendants for 
fraud arising from the sale of automobile service contracts.
58
  The 
plaintiffs and defendants were not completely diverse, that is, some 
plaintiffs and some defendants were citizens of Alabama.
59
 
The second amended complaint added another group of plaintiffs and 
defendants.
60
  This group of plaintiffs sued for fraud arising from the sale 
of extended service contracts of retail products.
61
  Plaintiffs then 
dismissed several of the defendants from the second group, leaving only 
one defendant.
62
  The remaining defendant, Lowe’s Home Center, was a 
citizen of North Carolina.
63
  No plaintiff in the second group was a 




The plaintiffs who were added in the second amended complaint 
brought an entirely distinct claim.  And by joining those claims into the 
same lawsuit, plaintiffs attempted to keep a diverse defendant in state 
court.
65
  The defendant, Lowe’s Home Center, removed the case to 
federal court and moved to sever the non-diverse claims.
66
  The plaintiffs 
then moved to remand to state court.
67
  The district court granted Lowes’ 
Motion to Sever and remanded the non-diverse actions to state court.  
The court, however, declined to remand the action against Lowe’s.
68
 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court’s decision.  
The court noted that the non-diverse defendants had “no real connection 
with the controversy” involving the second group of plaintiffs and 
Lowe’s.
69
  Moreover, the court recognized that the plaintiffs had 
attempted to use joinder to defeat diversity jurisdiction and determined 
                                                          
 56.  Id. at 1360. 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id. at 1355. 
 59.  Id.  
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id.  
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Id.  
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Id. at 1360. 
 66.  Id. at 1355. 
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Id. at 1360. 
 69.  Id.  
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that this misjoinder—what this article refers to as procedural 
misjoinder—constituted a new species of fraudulent joinder.
70
 
The court then pointed out that procedural misjoinder should only be 
applied when the misjoinder is “egregious.”
71
  Tapscott did not define 
what egregious means,
72
 and the failure to articulate a test for 
egregiousness has created great difficulties for district courts attempting 
to apply the procedural misjoinder doctrine. 
2. Applying the New Doctrine 
Following Tapscott, district courts struggled to apply the doctrine 
and some outside the Eleventh Circuit dismissed it altogether.
73
  The 
facts in Tapscott were unusual when compared to its common 
application.
74
  Tapscott established, however, that at some point 
misjoinder cannot be used as a tool to defeat diversity jurisdiction.  As a 
result, district courts were left knowing two things: the misjoinder in 
Tapscott was egregious and when a misjoinder is egregious parties 
cannot use it to defeat removal.  Consequently, district courts attempting 
to define egregious did so inconsistently.
75
 
For example in In re Diet Drugs,
76
 a district court in Alabama 
attempted to define the meaning of egregious by focusing on the 
plaintiffs’ motive for joining the parties.  The complaint in that case was 
originally filed in Alabama state court.
77
  Two of the nine plaintiffs were 
citizens of Alabama.
78
  The court concluded the joinder of the non-
resident plaintiffs was egregious for four reasons.  First, only two of nine 
plaintiffs were citizens of Alabama.
79
  Second, none of the non-resident 
plaintiffs had any contact with Alabama.
80
  Third, none of the non-
resident plaintiffs alleged any reasons for filing in Alabama.
81
  And 
                                                          
 70.  Id.  
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Percy, supra note 4, at 609. 
 73.  E.g., Rutherford v. Merck & Co., 428 F. Supp. 2d 842, 855 (S.D. Ill. 2006). 
 74.  Infra section III.B.1. 
 75.  Compare In re Diet Drugs, No. Civ. A. 98–20478, 1203, 1999 WL 554584, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 
July 16, 1999), with Rutherford, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 855.  
 76.  No. Civ. A. 98–20478, 1203, 1999 WL 554584 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
 77.  Id. at *1. 
 78.  Id. at *3. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
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finally, the court noted that because the non-resident plaintiffs were 
citizens of the same states as at least one defendant,
82
 they had no reason 
for filing in Alabama except to defeat removal by the defendants.  Thus, 
the court concluded that the misjoinder was egregious because the 
plaintiffs’ sole purpose was to defeat diversity jurisdiction.
83
 
In Greene v. Wyeth,
84
 on the other hand, a Nevada district court 
expressly refused to rely upon the plaintiffs’ motive for joinder in 
applying the procedural misjoinder doctrine.
85
  The court noted that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to avoid diversity jurisdiction and to draft their 
complaint accordingly.
86
  But, the court explained, the misjoinder was 
egregious because it “clearly accomplish[ed] no other objective than the 
manipulation of the forum.”
87
   
Taking yet another approach in In re Rezulin Products Liability 
Litigation,
88
 a New York district court specifically rejected the 
requirement that the misjoinder be egregious at all.
89
  In this multi-
plaintiff pharmaceutical action, the court acknowledged that the 
plaintiffs’ claims had “at least an empirical, if not a transactional, 
relationship.”
90
  Still, the court found the application of procedural 
misjoinder appropriate.  These cases illustrate the inconsistent attempt to 
define the type of misjoinder that warrants application of procedural 
misjoinder. 
Indeed, the court in Rutherford v. Merck & Co.
91
 surveyed the case 
law addressing procedural misjoinder and highlighted its inconsistent 
application.
92
  As the court described, the ten years since the Tapscott 
ruling had resulted in “enormous judicial confusion.”
93
  The confusing 
application, the court noted, was at least part of the reason for rejecting 
the doctrine.  The court then opined that the procedural misjoinder 
doctrine was “an improper expansion of the scope of federal diversity 
                                                          
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  344 F. Supp. 2d 674 (D. Nev. 2004). 
 85.  Id. at 685. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  168 F. Supp. 2d 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 89.  Id. at 145. 
 90.  Id. at 147. 
 91.  428 F. Supp. 2d 842 (S.D. Ill. 2006). 
 92.  Id. at 852–54. 
 93.  Id. at 852. 
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jurisdiction by the federal courts.”
94
  Accordingly, the court rejected the 
doctrine citing both its confusing application and its overstep of the 
federal courts’ jurisdiction. 
Finally, other circuit courts have not helped to clarify the doctrine as 
adopted in Tapscott.  The Ninth Circuit in California Dump Truck 
Owners Association v. Cummins Engine Company,
95
 for example, 
“assumed without deciding, that [the Ninth Circuit] would accept the 
doctrine[] of [procedural misjoinder].”
96
  In that case, several truck 
companies filed an action against several engine manufacturers in 
California state court.
97
  They alleged that several of the diesel engines 
that they had purchased were faulty.  All of the plaintiffs, except one, 
were citizens of California and diverse from the defendants.
98
  In 
response to the engine manufacturers’ argument that the non-diverse 
plaintiff had been egregiously misjoined, the court concluded that there 
seemed to be “some connection or nexus between the claims of the non-
diverse plaintiff and the claims of the diverse plaintiffs.”
99
  Therefore, the 
joinder of the non-diverse plaintiff “was not so improper as to be 
considered egregious, thereby justifying ignoring [the non-diverse 
plaintiff’s] presence in the case.”
100
  The Ninth Circuit, then, seemed to 
say that if there is some connection between the plaintiffs’ claims, the 
misjoinder is not egregious. 
In concluding that the plaintiffs shared “some connection,” the Ninth 
Circuit cited In re Diet Drugs.
101
  In that case, however, all of the 
plaintiffs alleged to have ingested a similar drug.
102
  Arguably, then, the 
plaintiffs in that case also shared some connection.  Therefore, it was 
unclear from the Ninth Circuit’s decision what kind of misjoinder was 
egregious and what type of claims constituted some connection between 
the plaintiffs.  Ultimately, Tapscott’s ambiguous standard needed 
clarification.  And the Eighth Circuit had the opportunity to weigh in on 
the doctrine in Prempro. 
                                                          
 94.  Id. at 852. 
 95.  24 F. App’x. 727 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 96.  Id. at 729. 
 97.  Id.  
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 730. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  In re Diet Drugs, No. Civ. A. 98–20478, 1203, 1999 WL 554584, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 
1999). 
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C. In re Prempro Products Liability Litigation: A Reference Point Case 
in the Development of Procedural Misjoinder 
In July of 2008, 123 plaintiffs filed three lawsuits against multiple 
manufacturers of hormone replacement therapy (HRT) drugs.
103
  The 
plaintiffs alleged that HRT had caused them or their family members to 
develop breast cancer.
104
  The plaintiffs filed their state law claims in 
three separate lawsuits, which were later consolidated.
105
 
In the Kirkland suit, 57 plaintiffs brought suit against 11 
defendants.
106
  The plaintiffs claimed HRT drugs manufactured by one of 
the 11 defendants had caused their injury.
107
  Fourteen of the plaintiffs 
were citizens of the same state as at least one of the defendants.
108
  That 
is, a plaintiff and a defendant were citizens of the same state; the 
plaintiff, however, was not necessarily suing that particular defendant.
109
  
Only three of the 14 plaintiffs sued the particular defendant that was a 
citizen of their state.
110
 
In the Allen suit, 60 plaintiffs alleged they had developed breast 
cancer as a result of the HRT drugs manufactured by at least one of the 
eight defendants.
111
  Although five of the plaintiffs were citizens of the 
same state as at least one defendant, only three asserted claims against 
the defendants from their same state.
112
   
Then in the Jasperson suit, six plaintiffs sued six defendants.
113
  One 
of the plaintiffs was from the same state as one of the manufacturers.
114
  
In total, 18 plaintiffs were citizens of the same state as at least one of the 
defendants.
115
  Only six plaintiffs actually asserted claims against 
manufacturers who were citizens of their same state.
116
 
                                                          
 103.  In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 617–19 (8th Cir. 2010).  
 104.  Id. at 617. 
 105.  Id. The suits were named the Kirkland suit, the Jasperson suit, and the Allen suit.  Id. 
 106.  Id.  
 107.  Id.  
 108.  Id.  
 109.  Id.  
 110.  Id.  
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id.  
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The plaintiffs filed their claims in Minnesota state court.
117
  The 
defendants then removed the cases to the federal court in the District of 
Minnesota and argued that complete diversity existed because the 
plaintiffs’ claims were egregiously misjoined.
118
  In other words, the 
defendants asked the court to apply the procedural misjoinder doctrine.  
The plaintiffs filed motions to remand to state court asserting that the 
federal court lacked jurisdiction because the parties were not completely 
diverse.
119
  Before the federal court in the District of Minnesota made a 
ruling, however, the cases came before the United States Judicial Panel 
on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) and the cases were transferred to the 
Eastern District of Arkansas, which handled the MDL.
120
 
The Eastern District of Arkansas, the MDL court, then ruled on the 
motions to remand.
121
  The MDL court found that the plaintiffs had been 
misjoined and noted “MDL courts have repeatedly held that misjoined 
plaintiffs will not defeat diversity jurisdiction.”
122
  Thus, the court denied 
the motion to remand for the diverse parties and granted the motion for 
the non-diverse parties.
123
  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, 
neither accepting nor rejecting the procedural misjoinder doctrine.
124
  
However, the court determined that even if it accepted the doctrine, the 
misjoinder was not so egregious as to warrant its application.
125
 
Prempro became a reference point in the development of the 
procedural misjoinder doctrine, in part because the Eighth Circuit was 
only the second federal appellate court to address it
126
 and in part because 
the court failed to define the egregiousness standard.  In addition, the 




                                                          
 117.  Id.  
 118.  Id. at 617–18. 
 119.  Id. at 618. 
 120.  Id.  Civil cases that involve one or more common questions of fact or law can be 
consolidated for pre-trial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407.  The United States Judicial Panel on 
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 121.  Prempro, 591 F.3d at 618. 
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 124.  Id. at 622. 
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 126.  See Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1360; see also California Dump Truck Owners Ass’n v. Cummins 
Engine Co., 24 Fed. Appx. 727 (9th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging procedural misjoinder but failing to 
adopt it). 
 127.  See, e.g., Rezulin,  168 F. Supp. 2d at 146–47 (acknowledging that several courts have 
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D. Current State of Procedural Misjoinder 
Courts, however, have continued to struggle to make sense of the 
procedural misjoinder doctrine. Tapscott concluded that the misjoinder 
before it was egregious,
128
 while Prempro concluded that the misjoinder 
before it was not as egregious as the one in Tapscott,
129
 but neither court 
articulated a clear standard to determine when a misjoinder is egregious.  
Some district courts determined that Prempro’s interpretation all but 
eliminated the requirement that the plaintiffs’ claims must arise out of 
the same transaction or occurrence.
130
  Other district courts have heavily 
criticized the Eighth Circuit’s analysis but found ways to distinguish it.
131
 
So, the doctrine today remains muddled.  When district courts have 
applied the doctrine, they have stressed different facts in their 
conclusions that a misjoinder is egregious.  Litigants are left knowing 
that egregious misjoinder probably cannot defeat removal.  But just what 
constitutes egregiousness is anyone’s guess.  However, some patterns 
have begun to emerge, and as this comment argues, a uniform standard 
may be within sight. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Although the development of the procedural misjoinder doctrine has 
been confusing, it is a necessary tool to allow courts to address the 
unrelated party problem in diversity jurisdiction.  The Eighth Circuit in 
Prempro had the opportunity to clarify this confusing doctrine, but 
missed its opportunity.  Other circuit courts considering the procedural 
misjoinder doctrine can avoid making the same mistake by 
acknowledging the increasing importance for clarification of the 
misjoinder doctrine.  By adopting a multi-factor test such as the one laid 
                                                          
applied procedural misjoinder in the context of remand petitions in multi-plaintiff pharmaceutical 
actions). 
 128.  Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1360. 
 129.  Prempro, 591 F.3d at 622. 
 130.  T.F. ex rel. Foster v. Pfizer, Inc., No 4:12CV1221 CDP, 2012 WL 3000229, at *3 (E.D. 
Mo. 2012) (holding that in light of Prempro the “[p]laintiffs claims need not arise from the same 
transaction or occurrence”). 
 131.  Infra section III.B.3.  See In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 
No. 11–3045, 2012 WL 1118780, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2012) (noting that, unlike Prempro, in the 
case before it there was evidence that the plaintiffs joined their claims to avoid diversity 
jurisdiction); In re Propecia (Finasteride) Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 12-MD-2331 (JG)(VVP), No. 12-
CV-2049 (JG)(VVP), 2013 WL 3729570, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. May 17, 2013) (“The plaintiffs here also 
do not allege the same type of discrete injury alleged by the plaintiffs in Prempro.”). 
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out in this comment, courts will ensure that the doctrine is neither 
confusing nor an inappropriate expansion of diversity jurisdiction. 
A. Why Procedural Misjoinder is Necessary 
Procedural misjoinder is a necessary and helpful doctrine because it 
tackles a common difficulty faced by courts.  The misjoinder of unrelated 
parties to prevent removal to federal court is an “enduring problem.”
132
  
Generally, both state and federal rules of procedure allow for liberal 
joinder of parties.
133
  The purpose for allowing the joinder of parties is to 
promote trial convenience and expedite the determination of the 
disputes.
134
  But the joinder of unrelated parties does not promote trial 
convenience and expedite the determination of the disputes.
135
  To the 
contrary, unrelated parties joined in a single lawsuit present individual 
issues that “obstruct and delay the adjudication process.”
136
  Thus, 
misjoinder of unrelated parties is problematic because it does not serve 
the purposes of the joinder rules. 
The joinder of unrelated parties is also problematic because it allows 
a party to manufacture a non-diverse lawsuit by manipulating the joinder 
rules.  Federal courts and statues generally disfavor tactics that avoid 
federal jurisdiction on a technicality.
137
  Indeed, this is the exact problem 
that the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) addressed.
138
  CAFA relaxed 
federal courts’ jurisdictional requirements for class actions to make it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to join non-diverse parties and avoid federal 
                                                          
 132.  Hines & Gensler, supra note 5, at 809. 
 133.  WILLIAMS & CAMPF, supra note 13, at § 5:26 (explaining that the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the joinder rules liberally). 
 134.  See id. (“The judicial justification for liberal joinder is efficiency.”); WRIGHT, supra note 
40, § 1652. 
 135.  Fosamax, 2012 WL 111878780, at *5. 
 136.  In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. Civ. A. 98–20478, 1999 WL 554584, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. July 16, 1999). 
 137.  In re Propecia (Finasteride) Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 12-MD-2331 (JG)(VVP), No. 12-CV-
2049 (JG)(VVP), 2013 WL 3729570, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 17, 2013); see also Mississippi ex rel. 
Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736, 744 (2014) (noting that the mass action provision of 
CAFA ensures that the “relaxed jurisdictional rules for class actions cannot be evaded”); Wecker v. 
Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 182–83 (1907) (“[T]he Federal courts may, and 
should, take such action as will defeat attempts to wrongfully deprive parties entitled to sue in the 
Federal courts of the protection of their right to tribunals.”); Rosenthal, supra note 43, at 73 (noting 
that while tactical devices to defeat federal jurisdiction are not expressly prohibited by statute, the 
courts apply various approaches to discern when parties wrongfully evade federal jurisdiction). 
 138.  Mississippi ex rel. Hood, 134 S. Ct. at 744. 
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court.
139
  So, even Congress has recognized that allowing manipulation 
of the rules to avoid jurisdiction is bad policy. 
Rejection of the procedural misjoinder doctrine would leave the 
problem unaddressed.  The permissive joinder of unrelated parties would 
not only fail to promote trial convenience and expedite the determination 
of the disputes but would, in fact, frustrate that very purpose.  Moreover, 
parties could manufacture a non-diverse lawsuit by manipulating the 
joinder rules.  Therefore, parties should not be able to thwart removal to 
federal court by manipulating the joinder rules and procedural misjoinder 
should be adopted to address the problem. 
B. Prempro: A Missed Opportunity 
1. An Ideal Opportunity to Clarify 
In Prempro, the Eighth Circuit missed an ideal opportunity to adopt 
and clarify the procedural misjoinder doctrine.  First, Prempro 
represented a common scenario in which procedural misjoinder arises.  
Moreover, unlike the court in Tapscott, the Eighth Circuit had nearly a 
decade of case law to consider.  Finally, the accumulated case law 
reflected an inconsistent understanding by lower courts that could have 
been clarified. 
Prempro represented a common scenario in which procedural 
misjoinder arises.  In the context of multi-plaintiff pharmaceutical 
actions, courts often deal with “clearly improper”
140
 but not “entirely 
unrelated”
141
 joinders of parties.  The plaintiffs have often taken the same 
type of drug, and there may be common issues of law or fact.
142
  
Recognizing the slight connection, not all courts deem the misjoinders 
“egregious.”
143
  Yet, they recognize the “express purpose of blocking 
removal.”
144
  When pointing out the mixed reactions of the district 
                                                          
 139.  Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
 140.  Propecia, 2013 WL 3729570, at *5. 
 141.  In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 621 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 142.  Id. at 620–21. 
 143.  See, e.g., In re Trasylol Prods. Liab. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2010) 
(holding that the misjoinder was not egregious because the plaintiffs all took the same drug 
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cases that came to opposite conclusions and were both multi-plaintiff 
products-liability actions.
147
  So, not only were the policy concerns 
apparent in the facts before the Prempro court, but they were also 
common. 
In its decision, the court made no attempt to define the meaning of 
egregious by addressing the decade and a half of case law that had 
attempted to apply the Tapscott holding.  Instead, the court attempted to 
define the meaning of egregious by looking only to the facts of 
Tapscott.
148
  Speaking of Tapscott, the court pointed out that “[t]he result 
of the amended complaints and joinder under Rule 20 was to create two 
distinct groups of plaintiffs and defendants: the non-diverse ‘automobile 
class’ and the diverse ‘merchant class.’”
149
  The court noted that the two 
Tapscott groups had “no real connection” with each other.
150
  Framing 
the issue in this manner, the court attempted to define the ambiguous 
standard by looking only to the facts of Tapscott.  However, the Prempro 
court had an advantage that the Tapscott court did not have—nearly a 
decade of accumulated case law. 
Finally, the case law attempting to apply Tapscott was unclear and in 
need of clarification.  The Prempro court acknowledged the district 
courts’ mixed reactions to the procedural misjoinder doctrine.
151
  The 
court recognized that some courts had appreciated the need to protect the 
statutory right to removal, while others had rejected the doctrine because 
of its ambiguity and expansion of federal diversity jurisdiction.
152
  So, 
the court acknowledged the competing policy concerns and the need for 
clarity.  Accordingly, as only the second circuit court to consider 
procedural misjoinder, the Eighth Circuit missed an ideal opportunity to 
clarify the doctrine and other circuit courts should avoid repeating the 
mistake. 
                                                          
that the structuring of the lawsuits was “deliberate and employed for the purpose of avoiding 
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 145.  No. 98-20478, 1999 WL 554584 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 1999). 
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 149.  Prempro, 591 F.3d at 621. 
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2. The Eighth Circuit’s Application of Procedural Misjoinder 
The Eighth Circuit did not expressly reject or accept the doctrine; 
instead, the court declined to weigh in on the doctrine’s propriety.
153
  
Yet, the court went on to conclude that the misjoinder was not so 
egregious as to constitute procedural misjoinder.  If this was meant as an 
implicit acknowledgment of the egregious standard, the court should 
have applied it clearly and explained its application.  Moreover, the court 
should have addressed the accumulated case law to clarify the standard. 
The Eighth Circuit should have expressly adopted the procedural 
misjoinder doctrine; yet, it “ma[de] no judgment on the propriety of the 
doctrine.”
154
  The court, however, was presented with a common factual 
scenario faced by district courts.  District courts are often confronted 
with the joinder of unrelated parties in multi-plaintiff pharmaceutical 
actions.
155
  And the policy concerns are apparent in this common 
scenario.  Had the court considered the policy concerns, it may have 
cautiously adopted the procedural misjoinder doctrine as necessary.  
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit erred by refusing to expressly adopt 
procedural misjoinder as a viable doctrine. 
In addition, if the court’s analysis was meant as an application of 
procedural misjoinder, it should have clearly defined the meaning of 
egregious.  After refusing to expressly adopt or reject the procedural 
misjoinder doctrine the court continued, “we conclude that even if we 
adopted the doctrine, the plaintiffs’ alleged misjoinder in this case is not 
so egregious as to constitute [procedural] misjoinder.”
156
  The court 
explained that the parties were not entirely unrelated, so they were not 
egregiously misjoined.  The court seemed to conclude that the plaintiffs’ 
claims were related.  However, this conclusion was a result of an overly 
broad interpretation of the “transaction” requirement under Rule 20 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The court’s broad interpretation of Rule 20’s “transaction” 
requirement was not consistent with the rule’s purpose, so it is unclear 
why the court interpreted it so broadly.  To determine whether the 
misjoinder was egregious, the court looked to the procedure by which 
                                                          
 153.  Id. at 622. 
 154.  Id. 
 155. See, e.g., In re Propecia (Finasteride) Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 12-MD-2331 (JG)(VVP), No. 
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plaintiffs may be joined.
157
  Although there is some question as to 
whether the state or federal rules of civil procedure should govern,
158
 the 
court concluded that it would make little difference to the analysis.  Rule 
20(a) allows a party to be joined if it asserts a claim “arising out of the 
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences” 
and “any question of law or fact common to the plaintiffs will arise in the 
action.”
159
  The court then noted that the word transaction has a “flexible 
meaning” and that all “logically related” events would satisfy the test for 
joinder under Rule 20.
160
 
Under this definition of transaction, the court concluded that the 
plaintiffs’ claims arose from a series of transactions between 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and individuals that used their product.
161
  
Moreover, the court accepted the plaintiffs’ argument that their claims 
were logically related because each had developed breast cancer as a 
result of some conduct of the defendant.  While applying this extremely 
loose definition of transaction the court failed to consider an important 
piece of the analysis.  Transaction should be “read as broadly as possible 
whenever doing so is likely to promote judicial economy.”
162
 
The complaints in Prempro joined different plaintiffs who were 
prescribed HRT drugs at different times by different doctors in different 
states.
163
  Instead of promoting judicial economy, the joinder of these 
plaintiffs into one suit would frustrate that very purpose.  Each plaintiff 
would have individual issues of causation and damages.  The complex 
question would arise of which state laws would apply to each of the 
plaintiffs’ claims.  Hence, the joinder of these plaintiffs into one lawsuit 
did not promote judicial economy.  True, the term “transaction” should 
be read broadly, but only when doing so “is likely to promote judicial 
economy.”
164
  Therefore, it is unclear why the court interpreted Rule 20 
so broadly because the joinder did not promote judicial economy.  Yet, 
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 158.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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the court seemed to suggest that the same transaction requirement was 
satisfied, or at least not egregiously misused. 
Like the Eleventh Circuit in Tapscott, the Eighth Circuit did little to 
set out what conduct would be deemed egregious.  Instead, it concluded 
that the joinder before it did not constitute an egregious misjoinder 
because the parties were not entirely unrelated.
165
  Ultimately, the court’s 
attempt to apply the procedural misjoinder doctrine was unclear.  And 
the court’s application resulted in confusion for district courts. 
3. Reaction to Prempro 
In re Propecia (Finasteride) Product Liability Litigation
166
 
exemplifies the confusion among lower courts created by the Prempro 
court’s broad definition of transaction.  As the Propecia court explained: 
“the [Prempro] court essentially ignored the ‘same transaction’ prong of 
the joinder inquiry.  Although the court noted that the plaintiffs’ claims 
all arose from a series of transactions, the court made no determination 
that their claims arose from the same transaction or series of 
transactions.”
167
  The Propecia court noted that the Prempro court did 
not provide any specificity about the conduct of the defendant.  
Therefore, “the [Prempro] court appears to have determined that the 
transactions were ‘logically related’ to each other, and thus satisfied the 
‘same transaction’ prong of the joinder analysis, not because of any 
similarity in the defendants’ conduct, but only because the plaintiffs had 
all suffered the same injury.”
168
  The Propecia court stressed that 
Prempro all but eliminated the “same transaction” requirement of Rule 
20. 
Still, the Propecia court found that that the plaintiffs before it had 
been egregiously misjoined even under the Eighth Circuit’s analysis 
because the plaintiffs did not provide enough specificity of their injuries 
to support their joinder.
169
  In Propecia, the plaintiffs alleged to have 
developed sexual dysfunctions “whose cause and manifestation [would] 
be unique to each individual.”
170
  The court noted that in Prempro, the 
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plaintiffs had all alleged the same type of discrete injury.  So, the 
Propecia court concluded that the joinder of the plaintiffs before it was 
not supported by the pleadings because the court could not determine 
whether their claims were “logically related.”
171
  Accordingly, the 
misjoinder of the plaintiffs was held to be egregious and warranted 
application of the procedural misjoinder doctrine. 
Meanwhile, in In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Products 
Liability Litigation No. II,
172
 the court concluded that the misjoinder in 
Prempro was not egregious because there was no evidence that the 
plaintiffs joined their claims to avoid diversity jurisdiction.
173
  In 
Fosamax, the plaintiffs’ allegations on the complaint were vague.  In that 
case, several plaintiffs joined together to sue several drug manufacturers 
in Missouri state court.
174
  The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ 
products had caused them to suffer a long bone fracture.
175
  The plaintiffs 
were from many different states and asserted several state law claims.
176
  
In their complaint, they alleged that the defendants concealed the risks of 
their products while at the same time exaggerating the benefits.
177
  
However, the plaintiffs were imprecise in naming the defendants.
178
  In 
other words, although it was clear from the face of the complaint that 
some plaintiffs alleged a cause of action against some of the defendants, 
it was not clear which plaintiffs claimed to have suffered injury by which 
defendants.
179
  This made it impossible for the court to determine which 
plaintiffs were truly non-diverse from the defendants.
180
  The court 
concluded that this imprecise pleading tactic was evidence that the 
plaintiffs had attempted to avoid diversity jurisdiction.  So, under 
Prempro’s analysis, the Fosamax court found the misjoinder was 
egregious and warranted the application of procedural misjoinder. 
Both the Propecia and Fosamax courts struggled to understand just 
what is egregious under the Eighth Circuit’s analysis.  Although both 
courts criticized the reasoning of the opinion, both ultimately strained to 
find a misjoinder egregious under the Eighth Circuit’s decision. 
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C. Now is the Time for Clarification 
Now is the ideal time for courts to clarify the misjoinder doctrine 
because the problem of unrelated joinder of parties is likely to intensify 
following the passage of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and the 
inability of the circuit courts to clarify the joinder doctrine. 
CAFA, passed by Congress in 2005, attempted to address the 
problem of joinder of unrelated parties in multi-plaintiff litigation.
181
  
The new law loosened the diversity jurisdiction requirements for class 
actions.
182
  Rather than requiring complete diversity, only minimal 
diversity is required in a class action.
183
  Moreover, the individual claims 
need not be over $75,000, but rather, the aggregate amount of the claims 
must exceed $5 million.
184
  Although, “Congress’ overriding concern in 
enacting CAFA was with class actions,” it also addressed multi-plaintiff 
actions that were not brought under the class action device—what the 
statute refers to as mass actions.
185
 
CAFA allows defendants to remove mass actions to federal court.  
“Mass action” as defined by the statute is “any civil action . . . in which 
monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried 
jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common 
questions of law or fact.”
186
  CAFA thus altered the traditional diversity 
jurisdiction requirements for mass actions.  CAFA allows the mass 
action to be removed to federal court when there is only minimal 
diversity, rather than complete diversity.
187
 
As the Supreme Court has explained: “The mass action provision 
thus functions largely as a backstop to ensure that CAFA’s relaxed 
jurisdictional rules for class actions cannot be evaded by a suit that 
names a host of plaintiffs rather than using the class device.”
188
  So, 
Congress anticipated that plaintiffs would push back on CAFA’s relaxed 
jurisdictional requirements by joining a large amount of plaintiffs in one 
state court suit.  To deal with this, Congress enacted the mass action 
provision, enabling  defendants to remove suits when more than 100 
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plaintiffs are joined together in state court. 
Seeking to avoid the removal jurisdiction of the federal court, some 
plaintiffs file multiple lawsuits in state courts—all with less than 100 
plaintiffs.
189
  So, the problem of joinder of unrelated parties gets worse 
because no matter whether the plaintiffs have any “real connection” they 
join together in state court and strategically structure the pleadings to 
avoid removal.  Absent procedural misjoinder district courts are likely to 
see many lawsuits filed with just under 100 plaintiffs, all of whom may 
not have a reason to join together except to defeat removal to federal 
court. 
Finally, other circuit courts contributed little to clarifying the 
procedural misjoinder standard.  For example, in Lafalier v. State Farm 
Fire and Casualty Co.,
190
 the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that “[t]here 
may be good reasons to adopt procedural misjoinder . . . [b]ut we need 
not decide that issue today.”
191
  Similarly, citing Tapscott, the Fifth 
Circuit noted “it might be concluded that misjoinder of plaintiffs should 
not be allowed to defeat diversity jurisdiction.”
192
  And, as noted above, 
the Ninth Circuit “assumed without deciding” that they would accept the 
doctrine.
193
  As a whole, the circuit court cases have been unhelpful in 
clarifying the standard of procedural misjoinder while at the same time 
seeming to be receptive to adopting it. 
Currently, therefore, the timing for a clarification of the procedural 
misjoinder doctrine would be ideal as courts struggle to make sense of 
Prempro, just as they struggled with Tapscott.  Moreover, the problem of 
unrelated parties joined in state court is likely to become more common 
in light of CAFA.  Finally, to date, circuit courts have been entirely 
unhelpful in clarifying the procedural misjoinder doctrine.  Accordingly, 
the time for clarification is now. 
D. A Solution: A Four Factor Test 
A uniform standard, narrowly tailored to its common application, 
would ensure a simpler application of the doctrine and prevent federal 
                                                          
 189.  See, e.g., In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2243 (JAP–LHG), 
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courts from overstepping their jurisdiction.  Courts have generally 
criticized procedural misjoinder for two reasons: 1) its complexity, and 
2) the danger of inappropriately expanding the federal court’s diversity 
jurisdiction.  However, a uniform standard would allow for a simpler 
application; and, narrowly tailored, the doctrine is only an extension of 
fraudulent joinder principles. 
Courts rightly criticize procedural misjoinder’s egregious standard as 
confusing and difficult to apply.
194
  What constitutes an egregious 
misjoinder is difficult to define because it depends heavily on the facts.  
Though difficult to define, guideposts can help courts remain consistent 
in their application.
195
  Implementing a multi-factor test would allow 
courts to address the competing policy concerns and allow for a simpler 
application. 
Moreover, a narrowly tailored procedural misjoinder doctrine is an 
appropriate expansion of fraudulent joinder principles.
196
  Indeed, as the 
Eleventh Circuit articulated in Tapscott, “[m]isjoinder may be just as 
fraudulent as the joinder of a resident defendant against whom a plaintiff 
has no possibility of a cause of action.”
197
  A party with “no real 
connection with the controversy” cannot defeat diversity jurisdiction 
simply by asserting a claim, which it does not have.
198
  The acceptance of 
procedural misjoinder can be seen as merely an extension of this 
principle.  Just as a party cannot defeat diversity jurisdiction by asserting 
a meritless claim, a party cannot defeat diversity jurisdiction joining 
parties who are not truly part of the controversy.  Thus, procedural 
misjoinder is not an inappropriate expansion of diversity jurisdiction, 
but, instead, a necessary corollary of fraudulent joinder. 
Implementing a multi-factor test would allow courts to address the 
competing policy concerns and allow for a simpler application of the 
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procedural misjoinder doctrine.  And although the development of the 
procedural misjoinder doctrine has been inconsistent, lower courts have 
helped contribute to a factor-based test.  Accordingly, courts applying the 
procedural misjoinder doctrine should consider the following factors: 1) 
whether the misjoinder frustrates the purpose of permissive joinder;
199
 2) 
whether the misjoinder meets the test for fraudulent joinder;
200
 3) 
whether it is clear which plaintiffs have claims against which 
defendants;
201




1. Frustrating the Purpose of the Joinder Rules 
Courts should consider whether the misjoinder frustrates the purpose 
of permissive joinder, which is to promote trial convenience and expedite 
the determination of disputes.
203
  In Fosamax the court illustrated why 
this factor would be helpful, particularly in multi-plaintiff 
pharmaceutical actions.
204
  In Fosamax, 91 plaintiffs from 28 different 
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(D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2012) (noting that the misjoinder frustrated the purpose of the joinder rules); Sutton 
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conclude by the plaintiffs’ allegations if they shared any logical connection); contra Atwell v. 
Boston Scientific Corp., No. 4:12-CV-2363 (CEJ), 2013 WL 136471, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 2013) 
(“Defendant argues the Court should find egregious misjoinder because plaintiffs fail to plead 
specific facts regarding their underlying medical conditions or the precise injuries they allege they 
sustained from defendant’s products.  These facts were omitted, defendant states, to conceal the 
absence of a common question of fact.  Furthermore, defendant argues, there are reasons to believe 
that several of the plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred.  In light of Prempro, the Court declines to find 
that these possible deficiencies in pleading amount to bad faith misjoinder.”). 
 203.  See Fosamax, 2012 WL 1118780, at *5 (noting that the misjoinder frustrated the purpose 
of the joinder rules); Propecia, 2013 WL 3729570, at *5 (explaining that Rule 20 should be 
interpreted broadly to promote judicial economy); see also WRIGHT, supra note 40; WILLIAMS & 
CAMPF, supra note 13, § 5:26 (“The judicial justification for liberal joinder is efficiency.”). 
 204.  Fosamax, 2012 WL 1118780, at *4. 
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states filed an action in Missouri state court against multiple drug 
manufacturers.
205
  Although the plaintiffs’ claims emanated from a 
general failure to warn theory, they asserted numerous state law 
claims.
206
  Their claims were “based upon various state law products 
liability theories, including, inter alia, defective design, negligence, 
fraud, misrepresentation, breach of express and implied warranties, and 
loss of consortium.”
207
  So, the various claims of 91 different plaintiffs 
were to be decided according to 28 different state laws.  Applying the 
law of 28 states to 91 plaintiffs does not promote trial convenience or 




The court noted, specifically, that the “joinder of plaintiffs in a drug 
product liability case in no way promotes judicial efficiency or 
convenience” not only because of the complexity of applying different 
state laws but also because of the challenging factual scenarios that such 
cases often present.
209
  The court then looked to the reasoning in In re 
Rezulin Products Liability Litigation.
210
  That case also involved multiple 
plaintiffs seeking to recover from multiple drug manufacturers for 
product defects.  The Rezulin court illustrated why the joinder of 
unrelated plaintiffs in drug product liability cases frustrates the purpose 
of the joinder rules: 
The plaintiffs . . . allege a defect (or defects) the precise contours of 
which are unknown and which may have caused different results—not 
merely different injuries—in patients depending on such variables as 
exposure to the drug, the patient’s physical state at the time of taking 
the drug, and a host of other known and unknown factors that must be 
considered at trial with respect to each individual plaintiff.  They do not 
allege that they received Rezulin from the same source or that they 
were exposed to Rezulin for similar periods of time . . . [T]hey do not 
allege injuries specific to each of them so as to allow the Court to 
determine how many plaintiffs, if any, share injuries in common.
211
 
Indeed, tort cases often involve the complicated tasks of determining 
causation and damages, especially in multi-plaintiff pharmaceutical 
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actions.  Joining otherwise unrelated plaintiffs in no way makes the tasks 
easier. 
A misjoinder that frustrates the purpose of the joinder rules warrants 
the application of the procedural misjoinder doctrine.  If the joinder rules 
are not being used to promote efficiency, then they are being used for 
some other purpose.  This inquiry is what has lead courts to quibble over 
the level of “bad faith,” if any, that the party must have.
212
  Considering 
whether the misjoinder frustrates the purpose of the rules allows a court 
to avoid the inquiry into the party’s motive.  Still, it allows the court to 
determine whether permissive joinder is being used as a tool to defeat 
diversity jurisdiction and thwart removal to federal court—a purpose that 
courts have found constitutes egregious misjoinder.
213
  Therefore when 
applying the procedural misjoinder doctrine, courts should consider 
whether the misjoinder frustrates the purpose of the joinder rules. 
2. Corresponding Test for Fraudulent Joinder 
Next, courts should consider whether the misjoinder would meet the 
test for fraudulent joinder.
214
  Some courts and commentators have 
suggested that the standards for procedural misjoinder and fraudulent 
joinder should be the same.
215
  For example, in Conk v. Richards & 
O’Neil, LLP,
216
 the court explained that the appropriate standard for 
procedural misjoinder was not provided by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, noting: “when [the plaintiff] filed his complaint in the [state 
court] he was not required to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in terms of joinder of parties.”
217
  Moreover, the court 
described procedural misjoinder as a type of fraudulent joinder.  So, the 
court concluded, the standard was essentially the same.
218
  Although 
procedural misjoinder has not been uniformly accepted as a viable 
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doctrine and warrants different treatment, the corresponding fraudulent 




Fraudulent joinder has long been accepted as an appropriate exercise 
of the federal court’s jurisdiction.
220
  By considering whether the 
misjoinder meets the test for fraudulent joinder, courts would address the 
concern that procedural misjoinder expands the scope of diversity 
jurisdiction beyond its limits.  If the misjoinder meets the test of 
fraudulent joinder, then jurisdiction would extend no further than already 
allowed under the fraudulent joinder standard.  Procedural misjoinder, 
then, would only be an extension of the fraudulent joinder doctrine. 
Although helpful, the fraudulent joinder standard should not be the 
sole inquiry because the questions that fraudulent joinder and procedural 
misjoinder seek to answer are entirely different.  Fraudulent joinder asks 
whether the joined plaintiff even has a valid claim against the defendant.  
Procedural misjoinder, on the other hand, asks whether the plaintiffs 
have any reason to be joined in the same suit.  Accordingly, the 
procedural misjoinder standard should not necessarily be identical to the 
fraudulent joinder standard because they ask different questions. 
Therefore, courts should consider whether the misjoinder meets the 
corresponding test for fraudulent joinder to keep the doctrine from 
expanding the limited jurisdiction of the federal court. 
3. Which Plaintiffs Have Claims Against Which Defendants 
Courts should then consider whether it is apparent from the face of 
the complaint if the plaintiffs are truly not diverse from the defendants.
221
  
In lawsuits with multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants it is often 
unclear which plaintiffs assert claims against which defendants.  For 
example, in Propecia, 54 plaintiffs claimed to have suffered injury as a 
                                                          
 219.  Courts have criticized the procedural misjoinder doctrine for the danger of federal courts 
overstepping their jurisdiction.  See Moore v. Mobil Oil Corp., 904 F. Supp. 587, 588 (E.D. Tex. 
1995) (“This court cannot rewrite the removal statute to grant itself subject matter jurisdiction.”); 
Rutherford v. Merck & Co., 428 F. Supp. 2d 842, 852 (“In the Court’s view, [procedural misjoinder] 
is an improper expansion of the scope of federal diversity jurisdiction.” (citing In re Norplant 
Contraceptive Prod. Liab. Litig., 976 F. Supp. 559, 561 (E.D. Tex. 1997))); see also Parsons supra 
note 26, at 65. 
 220.  In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 620 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 221.  See In re Propecia (Finasteride) Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 12-MD-2331 (JG)(VVP), No. 12-
CV-2049 (JG)(VVP), 2013 WL 3729570, at *6–8 (E.D.N.Y. May 17, 2013) (concluding that the 
misjoinder was egregious because diversity was not apparent from the face of the complaint because 
of the plaintiffs’ pleading tactics). 
  
2014] PROCEDURAL MISJOINDER 1457 
result of products containing finasteride.
222
  The plaintiffs filed an action 
against Merck and Company and Merck Sharpe Dohme Corporation 
(Merck), manufacturers of drugs that contained finasteride.
223
  All of the 
plaintiffs alleged that they took finasteride products.  Moreover, they 
clearly alleged which products Merck manufactured.  However, the 
plaintiffs did not allege that the products they actually ingested were 
sold, distributed, or manufactured by Merck.  As the court explained: 
“[t]his vague pleading tactic makes it impossible for the court to 




In addition, the court in Fosamax treated this “vague pleading tactic” 
as evidence that the plaintiffs structured their complaint in a manner to 
defeat removal.
225
  In that case, the court concluded that the “Plaintiffs 
[were] intentionally imprecise in naming Defendants, which [made] it 
impossible to determine whether some Plaintiffs truly are non-diverse 
from Defendants.”
226
  Thus, in finding that the misjoinder before it was 
egregious, the court noted that unlike Prempro, there was evidence that 
the complaint was strategically drafted to defeat removal. 
Considering whether it is apparent from the face of the complaint if 
the plaintiffs are truly not diverse from the defendants allows the court to 
determine if the joinder rules are being manipulated to manufacture a 
non-diverse lawsuit.
227
  Framing it this way, the court can avoid 
exploring the plaintiffs’ motive for the joinder.  Instead, the court would 
be using an objective measure: the complaint.  It may be true that one of 
the plaintiffs is from the same state as one of the defendants.  However, 
this factor would require that specific plaintiff to assert a cause of action 
against that specific defendant.  Viewing the complaint with this scrutiny 
would allow the court to determine if the joinder rules are being 
manipulated.  Thus, courts should consider whether the diversity of 
citizenship is apparent from the face of the complaint. 
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4. Sufficient Factual Pleading to Support Joinder 
Finally, the court should consider whether the pleadings are 
sufficiently factually specific to support the joinder.
228
  In Fosamax, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s product caused them to suffer long-
bone fractures.  However, the plaintiffs did “not identify with specificity 
which long bone(s) each individual injured.  Rather Plaintiffs state[d] 
that they ‘[had] suffered and [could] continue to suffer severe and 
permanent personal injuries, including weakened or brittle bones, 
multiple stress fractures, and low energy femoral fractures.’”
229
  The 
court concluded that the plaintiffs’ allegations were “exceptionally 
vague, making it difficult for the Court to establish how the Plaintiffs 
share a connection, if any.”
230
  The court seems to say that the plaintiffs’ 
vague pleading made it impossible for the court to analyze whether the 
parties were properly joined under Rule 20. 
Uncertainties that result from improper pleading should be resolved 
against the party who failed to plead properly.  At the pleading stage of 
the litigation no one, other than the plaintiffs, can know what connection 
the plaintiffs share.  The plaintiffs, then, should plead sufficient 
information that would support the joinder of the parties.  Uncertainties 
that result from the plaintiffs’ lack of proper pleading should not be 
resolved against the defendant.  Those uncertainties should be resolved 
against the plaintiff, who failed to plead with sufficient detail.  Thus, 
plaintiffs should have to provide a basis for the joinder by pleading with 
enough detail for the court to make a proper determination. 
Considering whether the pleadings are sufficiently specific to 
support the joinder would help the court understand whether the parties 
are truly unrelated, or if there is a reasonable basis for the joinder of the 
parties.  Therefore, the court should consider whether the pleadings are 
sufficiently specific to support the joinder because it would allow the 
court to determine if there is a reasonable basis for the joinder. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Since its adoption, the case law surrounding the procedural 
misjoinder doctrine has been neither consistent nor coherent.  District 
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courts have struggled to apply the egregious standard as set out by the 
Eleventh Circuit in Tapscott, and  nearly a decade and a half later, the 
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Prempro.  Neither court offered a clear 
standard of egregiousness to guide lower court application of procedural 
misjoinder.  Thus, the doctrine remains muddled and litigants are left 
with uncertainty. 
Although the development of the procedural misjoinder doctrine has 
been confusing, it should be adopted because it is necessary to allow 
courts to address the problem of joinder of unrelated parties.  The Eighth 
Circuit missed the opportunity to clarify the confusing doctrine even 
though the time and circumstances for clarification were ideal.  Other 
circuit courts considering the procedural misjoinder doctrine should 
avoid making the same mistake because the doctrine needs clarification.  
The current legal landscape therefore calls for clarification, not only 
because the standards applied to procedural misjoinder are often 
confusing and inconsistent, but also because the enactment of CAFA will 
likely make the problem of joinder of unrelated parties worse. 
As a solution, therefore, courts addressing the procedural misjoinder 
doctrine should consider adopting a multi-factor test laid out in this 
comment, considering: 1) whether the misjoinder frustrates the purpose 
of permissive joinder; 2) whether the misjoinder meets the corresponding 
test for fraudulent joinder; 3) whether it is clear which plaintiffs have 
claims against which defendants; and 4) whether the pleadings are 
sufficiently specific to support the joinder.  By considering these factors, 
courts would ensure that the doctrine is neither a confusing nor an 
inappropriate expansion of diversity jurisdiction. 
